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NOTES, COMMENTS and DIGESTS
MONOPOLY VERSUS COMPETITION IN AIR ROUTES
UNDER THE C. A. A.
The meaning of the terms "public interest" and "public convenience and
necessity" has long supplied speculative material for administrative agencies
charged with the regulation of public utilities. 1 Departing from past legislative
custom, the Congress in framing the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 established
certain factors as being in the public interest and in accordance with the public
convenience and necessity. Among them was listed: "Competition to the extent
necessary to assure the sound development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
2
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense."
The questions to which this section gives rise are multifarious. When is
competition necessary? Does this language assume the necessity of competition or if deemed unnecessary, does the Board have the power to entirely eliminate competition? These questions can and have arisen in two circumstances,
(a) a petition is filed for a new route or an extension of an old one, (b) petitioner asks permission to consolidate, merge, purchase, lease, obtain an operating
contract, or acquire control of another company.
Decisions have recently been rendered by the Civil Aeronautics Board in
cases involving these questions. The problem is whether these decisions possess
indices of sufficient definiteness to indicate an established policy on the part of
the Board. For while the Board has said that the disposition of each case "must
depend on the particular facts which justify or condemn competition under the
circumstances which are peculiar"8 to each case, it must of necessity eventually
pick out a pattern of precedent which cannot fairly be ignored.
1. George, Factors in Granting Motor Carrier Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity, (1930) 5 Ind. L. J. 243 Lake, Competition in the Public
Utility Fields, (1938) 10 Miss. L. J. 197, 214 Simpson, The Interstate Commerce Commission and Railroad Consolidation, (1929) 43 Harv. L. R. 192, 216.
2. 49 U.S.C.A. §401, 402 ; 58 Stat. 973, 980 (1938) §2. In the exercise and
performance of its yowers and- duties under this Act, the Authority shall consider the following, among other things, as being in the public interest, and in
accordance with public convenience and necessity(a)
The encouragement and development of an air transportation system
properly adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic
commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(b)
The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize
and preserve the Inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in,
and foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation, and to improve the
relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
(c)
The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air
carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences
or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practises;
(d)
Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development
of an air transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign
and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service and of the
national defense;
(e)
The regulation of air commerce in such a manner as to best promote
its development and safety; and
(f)
The encouragement and development of civil aeronautics.
3. In the matter of the application of American Export. Airlines Inc. 2
C.A.B. 16, 31.
(1941)
Docket No. 238.
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Certain broad statements of the Board should be noticed. In the MidContinent case, they said: "American air transport has developed upon the principle of stimulating progress by the entrusting to different and competing carriers
of alternative and competing routes between major terminals by way of different
intermediate points. ' 4 However, in the American Export case they said: "We
conclude that competition is not mandatory especially when considered in relation to any particular route or service. Clearly Congress has left to the discretion of the Board the determination of whether or not competition in a particular area is necessary to assure the sound development of an appropriate air
transportation system." 5 Are these statements consistent? To ascertain this,
cases involving, (a) new routes and (b) consolidations should be examined.
New Route Cases
In the All American case, 6 petitioner sought a certificate of convenience
and necessity to operate a feeder system between a large number of relatively
small communities, without engaging in competition with the existing air lines.
Mail and express was to be picked up and discharged by means of a
patented device which made it unnecessary to land at each intermediate point.
Petitioner held no other operating certificate. Operators of through routes
in the area intervened and contended that "the existing air transportation system should be given the opportunity to participate in the development of
'7
'feeder' routes and should not be preceded into this field by new companies."
After pointing out that the applicant was a pioneer in a type of service which
the established carriers had made no attempt to develop, the Board said: "Any
such theory as advocated by the interveners which would result in reserving
solely for existing air lines the privilege of providing all additio ito the present
air-transportation system of the United States is untenable. Our adoption
of such a policy would certainly not be consistent with a sound development
of air transportation and would not be conducive to the best interests of the
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, the Postal Service and
the National Defense."8
This statement must be contrasted with the position assumed by the Board
in the Dixie Airlines case. 9 Petitioner, without operating experience, applied
for a certificate to operate between Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Birmingham,
Alabama. However, Pennsylvania Central, an established carrier, contended
that logically the route should be given to them. After discussing the difficulties of establishing and maintaining convenient connecting service between
independent carriers, the Board awarded the route- to Pennsylvania Central,
saying: "In reaching this conclusion we recognize the fact that the considerations which lead us to this determination would be equally applicable in
any case in which an existing air carrier is competing with a company without
operating experience for a new route or service. The number of air carriers
now operating appears sufficient to insure against monopoly in respect to the
4. In the Matter of the Application of Mid-Continent Airlines Inc. 2 C.A.B.
63, 93 (1940) Docket No. 3-401 (B)-1.
5. In the Matter of the Application of American Export Airlines Inc.
2 C.A.B. 16, 31 (1940) Docket No. 238.
6. In the Matter of the Application of All American Aviation, Inc. 2
C.A.B. 133 (1940) Docket No. 363.
7. Id. at 145.
8. Id. at 146.
9. In the Matter of the Applications of Dixie Airlines, Inc., et. al. Jan. 30,
1941. Docket No. 162, etc.
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average new route case and we believe that the present domestic air transportation system can by proper supervision be integrated and expanded in a manner
that will in general afford the competition necessary for the development of
that system in the manner contemplated by the Act. In the absence of particular
circumstances presenting an affirmative reason for a new carrier there appears
to be no inherent desireability of increasing the present number of carriers
merely for the purpose of numerically enlarging the industry."' 0
Though two members dissented on other points, all five Board members
concurred in the choice of the carrier and the reason prescribed therefor. Of
these, three concurred in the All American case decided six months earlier, on
which there was likewise no dissent, one member not participating and one
not being a member of the Board at that time. Hence, it must be concluded
that the Board, though it made no mention of the earlier case, regarded both
as consistent.
If the expression of the latter case that in the absence of unusual circumstances development will be achieved through the expansion of existing air
carriers, is accepted as the paramount commitment of the Board, then the cases
are logically, at least, consistent. The All American case constituted an unusual circumstance for the company had a novel and useful patented device
which no one else had manifested any interest in exploiting.
The last new route case to be considered is that of the American Export
Airlines.1 1 Petitioner sought authorization to operate between the terminal
points, New York, New York, and Lisbon, Portugal. Intervener, Pan American Airlines, contested the application and sought to establish as precedent
decisions of other regulatory agencies, particularly the Interstate Commerce
Commission under the 1935 Motor Carrier Act, which say that where an operator furnishes the adequate, efficient and economical service required by public
interest, duplications will not be authorized. 1 2 Applicant not only denied the
authority of these cases but contended further that under § 2(d) of the Act,.
the Board was required to establish some competition in air transportation.
Rejecting both arguments, the Board said: "We conclude that competition in
air transportation is not mandatory, especially when considered in relation to
any particular route or service. Clearly Congress has left to the discretion
10. Id. at 51, 52.
11. In the Matter of the Application of American Export Airlines Inc. 2
C.A.B. 16 (1940) Docket No. 238.
12. Motor Carrier Act 49 U.S.C.A. §301: 49 Stat. 543 (1935) The Board
cited the following cases: Pan-American Bus Lines Operation 1 M.C.C. 190
(1936). In this case petitioner applied for a certificate of convenience and necessity to continue operation of "limited" motorbus service between New York
and Miami. Applicant's operations were begun too late to come under the
"grandfather clause." In granting the certificate the commission considered
whether the service rendered by other carriers was adequate and whether the
proposed service will answer a need or might endanger existing carriers. Clark
Common Carrier Application 1 M.C.C. 445 (1937). Petitioner sought a certificate
of public convenience and necessity to operate motorbus service between points
near Martlnsburg, W. Va. and points in Pennsylvania. The Commission denied
the application saying ". . . the maintenance of sound economic conditions in
the motor carrier Industry would be jeopardized by allowing new operators to
enter a field In competition with existing carriers who are furnishing adequate,
efficient, and economical service."
The position Is taken by Hall, Certificates of Convenience and Necessity,
(1929) 28 Mich. L. R. 276, 283 et. seq. that, exdept under unusual circumstances,
a certificate will not be granted a utility in an area in which a similar utility
is already operating unless (1) the existing company Is giving Inadequate and
unsatisfactory service, or (2) the petitioner proposes to render a service different
in some respects to the existing service.
See generally Lake, Competition in the Public Utility Fields, (1938) 10 Miss.
L. J. 197, 219.
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of the Board the determination of whether or not competition in a particular
area is necessary to assure the sound development of an appropriate air transportation system . .. The disposition of this case must depend on the particular
facts which justify or condemn competition under the circumstances which
are peculiar to this case." 13 The certificate was granted.
This case was decided by the same Board members, within the same month
as the All American case. Hence, the Board must have regarded these three
cases as consistent and indicative of their policy in new route applications. We
may say then that this policy, insofar as revealed is that: The Board is not
bound by precedent in other fields of transport regulation. While under the
Act it has power to establish a monopoly, particularly in relation to individual
routes or areas, the Board will, as a matter of policy, foster competition whereever feasible. However, in the absence of unusual circumstances, competition
and development will be achieved solely through the expansion of existing air
carriers.
Consolidations
Statutorily, the consolidation question is more complicated than the new
route cases by the inclusion in addition to § 2(d) of the provision in § 408(b)
that the Board shall allow consolidations when requested unless inconsistent
with the public interest: Provided that the consolidation will not "result in
creating a monopoly or monopolies and thereby restrain competition or jeopar14
dize another air carrier."
This language unfortunately raises questions as to legislative intent. Does
it mean that while the Board under § 2 may establish monopolies in new route
cases, it has no such power in consolidation petitions under § 408(b) ? Superficially the language of the statute implies as much. In construing § 408(b) the
Board has apparently conceded their lack of power to create a monopoly in
consolidation cases but has resolved the difficulty by defining monopoly "as
a condition embodying a particular degree of control." Hence they conclude
that while a consolidation may restrain competition or jeopardize another air
carrier, it is prohibited only if it arises from a degree of control which the
Board decides constitutes a monopoly of air transportation.1 5
13.

Supra note 11 at 31.

14.

49 U.S.C.A. §488 (b), 52 Stat. 1001 (1938)

"Any person seeking approval

of a consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract or acquisition

of control specified In subsection (a) of this section shall present an application
to the Authority and thereupon the Authority shall notify the persons involved
in the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract or acquisition of
control and other persons known to have a substantial interest in the proceeding
of the time and place of a public hearing. Unless after such hearing, the Authority find that the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or
acquisition of control will not be consistent with the public interest or
the conditions of this section will not be fulfilled, it shall by order, approve
such consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract or acquisition
of control upon such terms and conditions as it shall find to be just and reasonable and with such modifications as it may prescribe; Provided That the Authority shall not approve any consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract or acquisition of control which would result in creating a monopoly or

monopolies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier
not a party to the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or
acquisition of control ...."
15. United-Western Sleeper Interchange, 1 C.A.A. Reports 215 (temp.)
Docket No. 215 (1940). Here the applicants sought permission for interchange

of sleeper equipment on the transcontinental, New York, Los Angeles route.

The purpose was to eliminate the inconvenience to passengers necessitated by
enforced change from the planes of one company to those of another in the dead
of night. T.W.A. filed as intervener.
Agreeing with the intervener, the Board considered the case in the light of
§408(b). Intervener complained (1) that such an agreement was not in the
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The process by which they reach this result is ingenious.

They say, first,

"monopoly" must be defined. Courts have defined it in two ways, (a) "as
embracing any combination the tendency of which is to prevent competition
in its broad and general sense," and (b) "as a condition embodying a particular
degree of control." They then adopt the latter definition solely on the ground
that it makes the phrase in the statute, "and thereby restrain competition" nonrepetitious of the preceding word, "monopoly." 10

The Board's statement that two definitions of monopoly exist at law is
erroneous. The legal content of "monopoly" has always been restriction of
competition and reasonableness has been its measure. 17 Degree of control,
meaning control of the market, is the definition used by economists and despite
the frequency 'with which this phrase has graced judicial utterance, it has
never been given any intelligible content nor been used as an actual test of
monopoly. Judicial precedent holds nothing to support the Board's position.
However, why not adopt the economic definition which in many ways
is the sounder approach? We have no objection but what we wish to point
out is that by using the Board's method of reading it into the statute, not only
do the present difficulties remain undisposed of but new ones are created.
Suppose we accept the economic definition of monopoly. Its antithesis is
pure competition, a situation where no seller or buyer has any control over the
the price of his product. Contrast this with the legal antithesis of monopoly,
free competition, i.e., each individual is free to engage in legitimate economic
activity, unrestrained by the state, agreements between competitors or predatory
practices of rivals. These two types of competition are by no means equivalent
for there need be no agreement between them as to whether monopoly exists
in a single, given fact situation. It may well be that an economic monopoly
may exist in a legally valid situation. 1 8 But it is difficult to conceive of a
legal monopoly, i.e:, restraint of competition which would not also tend toward
an economic monopoly, i.e., control of the market. Yet it is just this the
Board says may happen. Indeed to speak of either free or pure competition at
all is highly .conceptual as restraints and controls are practically omnipresent.
In either case, when governmental regulation of business is in issue, the principal question is not as to what constitutes a monopoly, but what is to be the
public Interest, (2)

it would take away much of interveners business, i. e.

Jeopardy to another air carrier, and (3) It would give United a virtual monopoly
of all west coast business. The Board held that the added convenience to passengers by eliminating a change of planes was In the public interest, that It would
not Jeopardize the Intervener or restrain competition within the meaning of the
Act. The petition was granted.
16. Id. at'23 (mimeo. page no.)
17. The history of the treatment of the word "monopoly" at the hands of the

court is adequately discussed in, Mason, Monopoly In Law and- Economics, (1937)

47 Yale L. J. 34. The farthest any court-has ever gone in using the degree of
control test was United States v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 47 F(2d) 288
(C.C.A. 2d, 1931) which considered, (1) the merged concerns' share of sales in
the local markets, (2) inter-company competition in the area, their size and number, (3) Potential competition. However, the Court concludes "Competition Is
the antithesis of monopoly. In a sense any elimination of competition Is a movement in the general direction of monol)oly . . . It is only when this lessening is
with an unlawful purpose or by unlawful means, or when it proceeds to the point
where it Is or is threatening to become a menace to the public that it is declared
unlawful."
Such language is applicable solely to legal and not economic
monopoly.

The Board failed to cite this case and those cited by them are of lesser
authority.
18. The classic example of this is the Cream of Wheat case, Great A. and
P. Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co. 227 Fed. 46 (1915), wherein legally no
monopoly was found. Economically, there was. The question though of whether
It was an economically. bad monopoly is another issue.
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19
Hence for the Board to adopt one
degree of restraint or control allowed.
definition in preference to the other solely on the ground that certain degrees
of restraint do not constitute a monopoly is fictional. In fact their choice is
the worse horn of the dilemma for restraint of competition is a potential factor
in market control. Thus the statute is repetitous under their definition as well
and the statutory mandate that a monopoly shall not be created remains.
Assume for the moment the correctness of the Board's definition and construction of the § 408(b) proviso, what result follows? Such an interpretation
creates two tests of a consolidation's validity. In the words of the Board,
they are: "(1) whether or not the agreement is adverse to or inconsistent
with the public interest ... and (2) whether or not the agreement will result in
creating a monopoly . . ."20 Purportedly these two tests are distinct. However, the first is the same as the public interest test obtaining in the new route
cases wherein the monopoly-competition issue is always considered. Clearly
then, both tests go to the monopoly-competition question. Hence any difference between them must be one of degree. Under the public interest test § 2,
the Board has said it possesses full power to create a monopoly in new route
cases. 2 1 Then it must be true that it has no such unlimited power in consolidation cases because of the requirements of the second test, i.e., the § 408(b)
22
proviso.

Why this difference? Realistically what matter it if monopolies be created
by the establishment of new routes or the consolidation of existing carriers.
What justification exists for creating a greater degree of control through
new routes than through consolidations? Or, consider the case of the consolidation of non-competitors. Measured by the degree of control exercised,
a non-competitive merger may be more monopolistic than a merger of competitors, yet how much difference is there between the merger of non-competitors
and the creation of a new route. This seems to do little more than rest the
decision on the procedural manner in which the case arises.
Finally, is there any realistic distinction between the Board's two tests of
a consolidation's validity? Under the first, public interest, the Board must
establish "competition to the extent necessary." But the Board has said, if
competition is not necessary they have the power to establish a monopoly.
Under the second test, they say a monopoly is prohibited but the decision rests
with them whether a condition creates a monopoly. May they not, by refusing
to designate a situation monopolistic, obtain the same result under the last test
as under the first? Why then the two tests?
The solution can be much simpler. Section two states the Act's declared
policy. In case of doubt or conflict, it should control. Instead of engaging
in the gyrations demanded by the Board's approach, the much easier solution
lies in regarding the proviso of § 408(b) as a particularization of § 2(d) as
relates to that section. Hence the inquiry in any case is solely, to what extent
is competition necessary?23
19. "It Is impossible to separate markets into those that are competitive
and those that are monopolistic." Mason, Supra, note 17.
20. Supra, note 15.
21. American Export case, supra note 5.
22. But observe the position taken by Examiner Pound In the United Air
Line merger case. Said he, "it Is pretty clear that there Is no actual competition
between United and Western." Hence he reasoned that the proviso of §408(b)
had no application. This is, of course, true if the legal definition of monopoly Is
accepted.
23. For a discussion of this entire question from a slightly different aspect
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With this in mind, let us digress a moment to examine the results actually
reached by the Board in the two cases decided by it. In the United Air Lines
case, 2 4 petitioner sought approval for merger or purchase of Western Air
Express. The Board assumed the dual test of a consolidation's validity discussed aboie but in their consideration of the case purported never to reach
the second test, i.e., the § 408(b) proviso, because they held the consolidation not to be in the public interest, the first test. Yet the Board's findings were,
(1) that the approval of the application would give petitioner too great a
predominance in the area to be consistent with the national needs, and (2)
that the elimination of Western would not serve to maintain and encourage
competition to the extent necessary in that section of the country. What other
is this than the monopoly-competition question?
In support of its denial the Board said: "The congressional intent was
to safeguard against the evils of unrestrained competition on the one hand
and the consequences of monopolistic control on the other. In attaining this
objective the Act seeks a state of competition among air carriers to the extent
required by the sound development of the industry. The maintenance of such
constructive competition we believe will be best served at the present state
of the industry's development by a reasonably balanced system of air transportation in every section of the country." This is clearly the language which
the Board talks in the new route cases and agrees with the general theories
which they have there propounded.
In the Marquette Air Lines case 25 authorization was sought for the sale
of its assets to T. W. A. The Board granted permission. In so doing they
again followed the dual test, (a) that it was not inconsistent with the public
interest, (b) that it did not conflict with the first proviso of § 408(b). As
to the latter, they said, "The test here is whether the proposed acquisition will
result in giving T. W. A. the degree of control of air transportation or some
phase thereof within the particular section of the nation embraced in this pro26
ceeding, necessary to constitute a monopoly therein."
The Board here is clearly insisting on the economic concept of monopoly.
Though the process whereby they insert it into the Act is erroneous, the Board
is clearly correct in using it. This is illustrated by the procedure which
properly should be followed in any given case whether new route or consolida-

tion, either of competitors or non-competitors.
(I) The Board should consider the feasability of competition, it having
see note (19401 11 JnURNAL OF AIR LAW 359. This should likewise he fitted
Into the brondqr problpms di.cissed In Harnstra. Two Deoa'q-ederal
Aeroregulation In Perspective, (1941)
12 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 105.

24.

Application of United Air Lines Transport Corp. 1 C.A.A. Reports 230

(temp.) Docket No. Velu (1940).
25. Acquisition of Marquette by T.W.A. 2 C.A.B. 1 (1940). Docket No. 315.
It should be noted that at this time the petition was denied. However. this was

not because of the monopoly-competition question, on which the Bnard seems

never to have disagreed, but because the sale price was excessive. The pa-ties
reduced the price and again petitioned the Board who acquiesed in a decision
written Dec. 18, 1940.
In this opinion the Board divided on the question of
whether exchange value should b- allowed on a certificate of convenience and
necessity, the majority holding affirmatively.

26. Id. at p. 8. The Board cited the United-Western Sleeper case, 1 C.A.A.
Reports 215 (temp.) Docket No. 215 (1940) as being in accord.
In the instant case the Board laid considerable stress on the fact that the
applicants were non-competitors. Contrast this with the manner in which the
Board strained In the United merger case to find competition between the appli-.
cants as a reason for denial of consolidation. This approach Is dangerous if the
Board desires to follow the degree of control test. The applicant's competitiveness may have no relation to degree of control.

NOTES, COMMENTS, DIGESTS

287

complete power to establish a monopoly in proper situations. Feasability is
determined by the inquiry, is the present or immediately available traffic sufficient to economically sustain two or more carriers. The traffic inquired of
is that flowing between major terminals, the question of parallel line competition seldom arising in the air transport field. In close cases, a presumptive
need of competition exists.
(I)
Finding competition desireable, the inquiry is, what must be done
to obtain it, or conversely, how much may be done without destroying it?
This question seldom arises in new route cases but in consolidations, particularly those involving large systems covering vast areas, it may assume primary
importance. 27 Here the degree of control test finds its true use and the question is: What degree of control will be permitted? 28 The term "monopoly"
other than as used in economic theory is only a shorthand designation of any
control exceeding this limit. Restraint of competition and jeopardy to other
air carriers, mentioned in the statute, are two of various instruments for
determining the theoretical line of demarcation.
Generally, however, the
economists' emphasis is on control of the supply or price of a product. Product
is defined in terms of consumer choice. Price of course is not important in
the public utility field for rate regulation displaces competition.
If the Board is actually aware of the course upon which it has embarked,
it should be encourged. Acceptance of the degree of control test demands an
economic inquiry into what situations will be in the public interest. Public
interest cannot be determined categorically for it is not always served in the
same manner, and a formula rendering the solution of this question automatic
has yet to be devised. For the future the Board's efforts should be bent toward the formulation of controlling tests. 29 Toying with the words of the
statute as to what constitues a monopoly will obtain exactly nothing.

J. Howard Hamstra
Grant Watson
Richard Barber.
27.

Suppose, for example, that Eastern Air Lines and Northwest Air Lines

petitioned for permission to consolidate. Clearly these lines are not competitors
being solely east and west of Chicago respectively. If the legal approach to
monopoly is taken the problem is almost unapproachable for no restraint of competition can be found. But if we define monopoly in terms of control the issues
may then be articulated, viz. the effect of the establishment of a new transcontinental route and better services offered to localities.
28. "The sources of evidence of control of the market are known: The
behavior of prices and outputs, the relation of prices and costs, profits before
and after the combination, share of the market controlled, the existence of business practices such as price discrimination, price stabilization." Mason, supra
note 17 at p. 42.
29. This whole question should be compared with what has been done under
the Interstate Commerce Act which required the commission to formulate a plan
for the consolidation of railroads. What has occurred has been adequately detailed by Scharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission (see
articularly
p. 430 et. seq., Vol. Ilia.) (1936).
See also, Eastman, Regulation of Railroads,
73d. Cong. 2d., Sen. Doc. 119 (Jan. 20, 1934).
While the problem of the Civil Aeronautics Board is different, insofar as
they arrived on the scene before too many operators had become established, may
they not also profitably give consideration to the problem's broader aspects? It
is believed that such statements as uttered by them in the Dixie case indicate
a disposition on their part to do so.
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ANCILLARY JURISDICTION IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
It has long been recognized that the statutory jurisdiction of the federal
courts is implemented by an ancillary jurisdiction lacking express statutory
authorization.' One phase of this ancillary jurisdiction, viz., the third party
practice, has been' the subject of extensive development in other courts' and
has recently been a topic of much comment by legal writers.' However a study
of the cases reveals that the relation of the third party practice or impleader
device to other related ancillary procedures is confused.'
The courts have been prone, both to use the general term "ancillary"
'
without designating or defining the specific type of situation involved and to
cite cases involving one type of ancillary action in support of another.' Although
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction has been reaffirmed by many courts, and
the word "ancillary" has been used by federal courts for approximately 125
years in the disposition of suits, the scope of the doctrine is by no means
clearly defined today.
Scope of the Ancillary Doctrine
The use of variant types of ancillary actions is premised upon the theory
that ancillary jurisdiction is essential to the independence and self-sufficiency
of the federal courts. But since courts have loosely used the term "ancillary,"
which is at best vague, and since new instances of ancillary suits constantly
arise, classification of ancillary types is difficult. Hence most legal writers
have been content to list the various types.' However, at least one writer,

while expressly manifesting his awareness that his classification was illustrative
1.

Logan v. Patrick, 9 U. S. 288 (1809) ; The Cortes Company v. Thann-

hauser, 9 Fed. 266 (C.C. N. Y. 1881) ; Dunn v. Clarke, 33 U.S. 1 (1834) ; Penn v.
Klyne, Fed. Cas. No. 10,936 (C. C. Pa. 1817) ; Clarke v. Mathewson, 37 U. S.
164 (1838).
2. State court practice: Bennett, Bringing In Third Parties By the Defendant (1934), 19 Mlnn. L. R. 163,173 et seq; 1 Moore's Federal Practice (1938),
761-779; Cohen, Impleader: Enforcement of Defendant's Rights Against Third
Parties (1933), 33 Col. L. R. 1147, 1152-1166 and appendix.
Admiralty Practice: 1 Moore's Federal Practice 749 ; Cohen, supra, at 1167.
English practice: Bennett, supra, at 168-173 ; 1 Moore's Federal Practice 756
Cohen, supra, at 1169 and appendix.
3. Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limits on Federal Procedure (1936) 45 Yale L. J. 393,417; Clarke and Moore, A New Federal Civil
Procedure, II, Pleadings and Parties (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 1291; and others not so
recent had advised the establishment of a federal procedure which would permit
the third party practice. Since this procedure was created (the new Federal
Rules became effective on Sept. 16 1938), much has been written concerning
the problems created by this and other ancillary proceedings. For more specific
discussions, see note, (1940) 7 U. of Chi. L. R. 359; note (1939), 26 Va. L. R.
117; note (1940), 53 Harv. L. R. 449; note (1940), 27 Va. L. R. 376.
4. The uncertainty of the courts is illustrated by references to Webster's
International Dictionary and legal thesauri to ascertain the meaning of the
word "ancillary." Schram v. Roney, 30 F. Supp. 458,461 (D.C..Mich., S. D. 1939).
A modern court has considered the present status of ancillary jurisdiction doubtful
enough to trace the development. Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp.,
29 F. Supp. 112 (D. C. Conn. 1939).
5. Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 112 (D. C. Conn.
1939) where the principal case involved a third party action, but reliance was
placed on a counter-claim case. See also Bossard v. McGwinn, 27 F. Supp. 412
(D. C. Pa. 1939).
6. Barth v. Makeever, Fed. Cas. No. 1 069 (C. C. Ind. 1868) ; Stone v.
Bishop, Fed. Cas. No. 13,482 (C. C. Mass. 1818) ; Thompson v. McReynolds. 29
Fed. 657 (D. C. Ark. 1887) ; Kuhn v. Morrison, 75 Fed. 81 (C.C. Ga. 1894)
Bossard v. McGwinn, 27 F. Supp. 412 (D. C. Pa. 1939).
7. 1 Moore's Federal Practice 462, Bunn, Jurisdiction and Practice of the
Courts of the United States (fourth ed., 1939), 24-25 ; 1 Foster Federal Practice
(6th ed. 1920), § 51. Dobie, Handbook of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure
(1928) A23-324, adopts a classification based on Williams, infra note 9.
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rather than scientific, has attempted classification.8 In order to facilitate an
understanding of certain recent developments in the ancillary jurisdiction of
the federal courts, a representative classified list of types of ancillary proceedings
is here offered. The differentiation used for classifying the types depends primarily on the status and interest of the parties, rather than on the legal reasoning
or result. If such a distinction exists, courts err when they cite cases involving
one type of ancillary action in support of another.'
(A)

Ancillary jurisdiction exercised under inherent judicial powers as a
matter of necessity:
10
1. Suits Primarily Involving Property
(insolvency and foreclosures).

In certain situations, after the discharge of a debtor, the bankruptcy courts
may stay an action in a state court because it is unduly burdensome for the
discharged bankrupt to plead his discharge. Thus, a bankruptcy court has

ancillary jurisdiction to preserve the advantages of its judgment of discharge."1
2.

Enforcement and Protection of Court Processes.

A bill to enjoin a pending federal action or to prevent abuse of the process
8. Williams, Jurisdiction and Practice of Federal Courts (1917), 89, classifled ancillary jurisdiction with respect to (a) property in actual or assumed
control, and (b) matters of record and process. In a later book, Williams
expanded the above classification as follows: "By a broad generalization, the
true ancillary jurisdiction may be said to exist with respect of two subjectmatters, namely: (a) property within, or treated as within, the court's possession
or administrative control; (b) the records, processes, judgments and decrees of
the court in the principal cause. This classification is not scientific, because no
clear line can be drawn separating the classes. Class (a) might be subdivided
into (1) cases where there is actual possession, and (2) where jurisdiction
has been acquired over the res, but it has not been, or by reason of its nature
cannot be, taken into actual possession." Williams, Federal Practice (Second
Ed., 1927) 279-280.
9. This Is not intended to be a complete or exclusive classification, but
Is presented mainly as an aid to discussion of the cases in this comment. Such
a classification is subject to, and can readily be expanded to include other types
of ancillary suits not under consideration, especially new classes as they are
created. The distinction between the classes is not rigid, and a given case may
fall within more than one class, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234
(1934), which could come under both class 1 and class 2. Although this classification is apparently based on the situation existing under the new Federal
Rules, reference to the cases cited will reveal that this is not the actual situation,
since most of the cases arose prior to the adoption of the new Rules. However,
since the applicable Rules are a codification, in part, of some previously existing
useful practices, it is a helpful coincidence that the same classification can
also be applied to cases arising subsequent to the new Rules.
It is worth noting that interpleader suits have also been considered ancillary,
thus eliminating the necessity for independent Jurisdiction. Bossard v. McGwinn,
27 F. Supp. 412 (D.C. Pa. 1939) ; Kravas v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.,
28 F. Supp. 66 (D.C.P.A. 1939).
10. For a discussion of the ancillary Jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts,
which is a field in itself, see 1 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th Ed. 1940) 291.
11. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934) ; Julian v. Central Trust
Co., 193 U.S. 93 (1904) ; Riverdale v. Alabama and Georgia Mfg. Co., 198 U.S.
188 (1905) ; Steelman v. All Continent Corporation, 301 U.S. 278 (1937). The
equity receivership court will also protect its decrees in similar situations.
Bethke v. Grayburg Oil Company, 89 F.(2d) 536 (C.C.A. 5th, 1937). Pope v.
Louisville, New Alb., Etc., Co., 173 U.S. 573 (1899) ; White v. Ewing, 159 U.S.
36 (1895) ; Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilso, 142 U.S. 313 (1892) ; Kirkland v. Knox.
230 Fed. 806 (C.C.A. 4th, 1916) ; all holding that actions by receivers to recover
Property and assets belonging to but withheld from the estate to be administered,
are ancillary in jurisdiction. On the ancillary powers of receivers see note
(1940), 26 Va. L. R. 954. Foreclosure: Morgan's L. and T. R. and S. S. Co. v.
Texas Cent. Ry. Co., 137 U.S. 171 (1890) ; Continental Trust Co. v. Toledo.
St. L. and K. C. R. Co., 82 Fed. 643 (C.C. Ohio, 1897).
Another form of ancillary Jurisdiction, which is closely allied to the insolvency phase In that it usually relates to Jurisdiction over property, Is more
conveniently dealt with as a species of comity, and does not require more than
passing mention here. Reynolds v. Stockton 140 U.S. 254 (1891) ; Adams v.
Mercantile Trust Co., 66 Fed. 617 (C.C.A. 5th, 18*95). Cf. Holden v. Circleville
Light and Power Co. 216 Fed. 490 (C.C.A. 4th, 1914). The matter of realignment of parties in determining Jurisdiction lnvo'e. %-iclllary considerations.
See note (1927), 40 Harv. L.R. 1015.
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of such court is addressed to the court as an ancillary proceeding."2 Where
the United States has consented to be sued, and the plaintiff sues and obtains
a decree, subsequent proceedings on the same decree may be maintained without
any additional consent on the part of the Government."
(B)
Purely procedural exercises of ancillary jurisdiction, which are not
essential but exist because of convenience:
3. Cross Claims and Counter-Claims.
Where jurisdiction of a plaintiff's claim is based on federal grounds, and
the defendant's counter-claim has no such grounds, it cannot be brought as
an independent action in the federal courts; nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has held that jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim affords sufficient basis to
adjudicate the defendant's counter-claim. 1 '
4.

Third Party Impleader1

A federal District Court having jurisdiction over principal actions for the
death of plaintiffs' decedents in an airplane crash caused by a defective engine
cylinder manufactured by the defendant, has ancillary jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of such defendant's third party complaint, charging the party
impleaded thereby with negligence in selling to the third party plaintiff a forging
used in manufacturing the cylinder.'"
5. Intervention.
When a federal court has jurisdiction over a cause or a res, other parties
whose citizenship would not have allowed them to institute the suit, may intervene to assert their rights though they could not have had original process."
12.

Thus, where P obtained a judgment in a state court against D, and

D obtained a judgment in a federal court against P, then assigned the federal
Judgment to X, without consideration, and then filed a petition in bankruptcy,
listing P's state judgment as a debt, P was permitted, in the federal court, to
enjoin execution by X of the federal judgment, even though there was no
diversity between P and X. Dickey v. Turner, 49 k'.(2d) 998 (C.C.A. 6th. 1931).
13. Becker Steel Company or America v. Cummings, 16 F. Supp. 601 (D.C.
N.Y. 1936). A suit in mandamus to compel levy of taxes by a county to satisfy
a judgment has been held to be ancillary. Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S.
166,198 (1867) ; The Board of Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall. et
al., 85 U.S. 376 (1860); Rosenbaum v. Bauer, 120 U.S. 450 (1887).
Maitland
V. Gibson, 79 Fed. 136 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1897), holding that a bill filed to enforce
the payment of costs against the plaintiff in an equity suit, may be treated as
dependent proceeding. See aso Gumbel v. Pitkin, 113 U.S. 545 (1884).
14. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593,610 (1926) ; General
Electric Company v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430 (1932)
Lehman.
Administrator, v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448 (1932) ; First
National Bank of Salem v. Salem Capital Flour-Mills Co., 31 Fed. 580 (C.C.
Oregon 1887), cross-bill. See Rule 13, of the new Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
15. This practice, which is provided for under Rule 14, 28 U.S.C.A. following §723c, was not available to litigants in the federal courts prior thereto.
See, however, dictum in Compton v. Jessup, 68 Fed. 263,279-280 (C.C.A. 6th.
1895), to the effect that third party impleader was permissible. In 1933, Cohen,
supra note 2 at 1167, said that the federal courts have jurisdiction over impleader
suits, citing Lowry and Co. v. National City Bank, 28 F.(2d) 895 (D.C.N.Y.
1928). However, this was not an independent impleader jurisdiction, but existed

under a conformity act.

16. Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F.Supp. 112 (D.C.Conn.
1939) ; Gray v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 31 F.Supp. 299,305 (D.C.
La. 1940)
Morrell v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F.Supp. 757 (D.C.
N.Y. 1939).
17. Henderson v. Goode, 49 Fed. 887 (C.C. La., 1892). Where goods were
attached by process of the Circuit Court, a third party who claimed title to
such goods could file a bill on the equity side of the court, and this proceeding
would be considered ancillary. Krippendorf v. Hyde 110 U.S. 276 (1883)
Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. 450 (1860) ; Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886)
Osborne v. Barge, 30 Fed. 805 (C.C. Iowa 1887) ; Minot v. Mastin 95 Fed. 734
(C.C.A. 8th, 1899). Towle v. Donnell, 49 !F.(2d) 49 (C.C.A. 6th, 1631), allowed
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6. Substitution.
When the jurisdiction of a federal court has once fully attached' by reason
of the diverse citizenship of the parties, or where a cause begun in a state
court is removed to a federal court for the same reason, the question of jurisdiction will not be affected by any subsequent substitution or change of parties.' 8
Ancillary jurisdiction exists both at law and in equity, and, in variant
degrees, it is characteristic of every court of justice. However, because of
the difficulties of joinder in law actions previous to the new Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and the contrasting greater flexibility of suits in equity,
the procedural development of ancillary jurisdiction in these courts has lacked
uniformity. However, since the provision of procedural machinery by the new
Rules, the effectiveness of such procedures as the impleader practice have made
the popularity of ancillary jurisdiction as great at law as it was in equity
previously."9
Development of the Theory and Use of Ancillary Jurisdiction

Rationale.20
The delinitive statements of most legal authorities appear to found the
doctrine ol ancillary jurisdiction on the basic principles oi justice, necessity
and eniciency."' Ancilary jurisdiction exists because of the relation of the
A.

inci.entai proceeding to the principal case over which original jurisdiction
alreauy exists. 'I his relation alone creates and establishes such ancillary jurisa

cialalanc o land to eiijoin a sale by a marshal under a levy made to collect
a LeuCe'ti JutLhnellt ooained against tile supposed owner of tne land, although
tnere was iio uilerslty bet,,een the claimant and the maislal. See also. bt.
Louis-z,al
i,'raliclwsokty. Co. v. mi "l,'ain, 253 Fed. iz
(D.C. Mo., 1918);
Coui.itonl
V. JesSiup, 68 Feu. 263 (C.C.A.tit,
1895) ; Widman v. hIuoaru. 88
FVed. 806 (C.C. Ca,., 185V), in wiich a bill in equity uy a tLnlru persun to enjoin
1,rosecutiin of aln action at law pendlng therein was neld ancillary to tile law
a1tLOll, and ii.e cou.', tOOK jm isulCtlon witnout regard to the citizenship of the
parlies. Snow v. Railroad Co., 16
ed. I (C.C. Texas, 188%).
61. An. L. Rev.
1,siu,
ihas an e.ceiient development of the intervention phase.
18.
Conversely, if the action was not originally cognizable in a federal
court, the sub.titut0on or addxi~on of parties possessing a dilerent citizenship
will 1ot eniitle them to invoke fedeal jurisdiction. Jaiboe v. Templer, 38 Fed.
213 (C.C. 1Kansas, 1889). See also Clarke v. Mathewsom, 37 U.S.' 164 (1838) ;
Hardieoergh v. Ray, 151 U.S. I2 (1894) ; Harris v. k-es5, 10
'eu. 32 (C.C.N.Y.
1sd) ; State of Texas v. Lewis, 12 Fed. 1 (C.C. Tex., 1882). Also, Stewart v.
liunainam, 115 U.S. 61 (1885).
19. The ioim of the ancillary proceeding is not determined by the character of the principal case. The anciliary proceeding may be an equitable action
%uhiletle
o.-gin..i proceeding is an action at law, and vice versa. Logan v.
Patrick, 9 U.S. 288 (1809) ; Carey v. McMillan, 289 Fed. 380 (C.C.A. 8th, 1923) ;
Lanib v. Ewing, 54 Fed. 269 (C.C.A. 8tn, 1893). The distinction between original
or independent, and ancillary or supplemental, Iproceedings, while in some few
respects coincidept with the distinction in equity pleading between original and
supplementary proceedings, is not the same, for when applied to jurisdiction,
the term "ancillary" has a broader significance than when applied to pleadings
in equity. Milwaukee Company v. St. Paul Company, 69 U.S. 609,663,634 (1864).
See Carey v. Huston Texas Railway, 161 U.S. 115 (1895) ; Kripi.endorf v. Hyde,
110 U.S. 276 (1883).
20. Apparently, the courts have been interested only in the general phraseology 'ancillary," and have construed principles to be generally applicable to
almost all "ancillary" situations, although recognizing the creation of the rule
in a particular ancillary situation. Consequently, there has developed a general
law of ancillary proceedings, rather than a specific set of laws governing each
type of ancillary suit.
21.
Dobie, Federal Procedure, (1928) 323 ; 21 Corpus Juris Secundum 136:
Williams, Jurisdiction and Practice of Federal Courts (1917) 87, says: "It must
be remembered that the actual accomplishment of justice is the very ratio essendo
of courts and their investiture with Jurisdiction. That purlose would not be
satisfied, in the present fallibilitY of human nature, were the powers of the
court to end with the rendition of a paper decree. That decree must be enforced
and put into actual and final effect within the territorial jurisdiction between
the parties and their privies. It is therefore settled that the jurisdiction persists,
until the Judgment, In its true intent and meaning, be completely satisfied; and
in the pursuance of this satisfaction, all co-ordinate courts, and especially the
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diction.2" However, through the exercise of this jurisdiction, federal courts
have extended their judicial power over many matters which the apparently
strict limitations of the Constitution"3 as defined and further limited by legislation' would seem to foreclose. Ordinarily, a suit in which the constitutional
requisites of jurisdiction cannot be alleged is not within the purview of the
federal courts. However, though when viewed independently a suit cannot
sustain itself jurisdictionally, it may be supported because of its incidental
or supplemental relation to the principal case, which gives the suit its ancillary

character.
This is instanced in the case of Drumright v. Texas Sugarland Co.,"
where a mortgagee and former equitable owner of property joined as plaintiffs
to sue the purchasers of the property. They asked for foreclosure of the
mortgage or for the declaration of an equitable lien or for recission. However,
because the former equitable owner had the same citizenship as one of the
defendants, the action could not be maintained on the basis of ordinary federal
jurisdiction. Inasmuch as the equity owner was not a necessary party to the
suit, he was dismissed. However he then filed a petition of intervention, which
was allowed. Thus ancillary jurisdiction allowed the court to adjudicate the
same rights which were foreclosed to it on the basis of its original jurisdiction.
Many arguments early devised to overcome this federal jurisdictional
deficiency have persisted to this day. 2 One of the soundest rationales devised
to support a case lacking the constitutional or statutory requirements for an

original proceeding was that advanced in the case of Minnesota Company v.
St. Paul Company." This case established that the incidental suit was not
original but ancillary; hence no independent grounds of jurisdiction were necessary as in original actions."' As stated by Mr. Justice Nelson: "The principle
federal and state courts, are entitled to pursue as against each other, within
the limits of their jurisdiction, their independent and untrammeled ways toward
that consummation." See also, Id. at 82-83. Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131
(1888) ; Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. 450 (1860); Compton v. Jessup, 68 Fed.
263.279 (C.C.A. 6th, 1895).
22. Dunn v. Clarke 33 U.S. 1 (1834) ; Jones v. Andrews 77 U.S. 327 (1870)
Krippendorf v. Hyde 110 U.S. 76 (1884); Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61
(1885); Gumbel v. Pitkin. 124 U.S. 131 (1888) ; Morgan's Louisiana and T.
Ry. & S.S. Co. v. Texas Cent. Ry. Co., 137 U.S. 171 (1890) ; Julian v. Central
Trust Company, 193 U.S. 93 (1904) ; G. and C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfleld, 241
U.S. 22 (1916) ; Hoffman v. McClelland, 264 U.S. 552 (1924).
23. Art. III, §2 contains the following grounds for the exercise of federal
judicial power, of which the first two are the most common: diversity; federal
question; admiralty, cases affecting ambassadors and other public ministers;
citizens of the same state claiming land grants from different states; where

the United States is a party ; controversies between states.

24. Sec. 24 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. §41, constitutes the Congressional outline of the requisites of the "original Jurisdiction" of the federal
courts, and adds a monetary requirement of $3,000.
25. 16 F.(2d) 657 (C.C.A. 5th, 1927).
26. They are now applied to cases arising under the new Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Scharm v. Roney, 30 F. Supp. 456,460 (D.C. Mich., 1939) : discussion in Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 112 (D.C.
Conn., 1939).
27. 69 U.S. 609 (1864).
28. Art. III, §2 of the Constitution does not mention original actions, but
merely defines the limits of the Judicial power of the United States. However.
the Federal Code, in establishing the Jurisdiction of the federal district courts,
embodies two Constitutional limitations, diversity and a federal question, and
places an additional limitation, viz., $3,000. These requisites apply to original
actions; but ancillary jurisdiction has made it possible to dispense with these
requirements in certain cases. An ancillary action is usually considered as
"supplemental," but a better word would be "incidental," for a counter-claim
is not supplemental, yet still considered ancillary.
The distinction between an ancillary and an original action may sometimes
become so faint as to be Indistinguishable, but the theory is nevertheless a
dependable basis on which to allow relief to a party who would otherwise be
remediless. This is instanced by the case of Johnson v. Christan, 125 U.S. 642
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is, that a bill filed on the equity side of the court to restrain or regulate judgments or suits at law in the same court, and thereby prevent injustice ... is
not an original suit, but ancillary and dependent, supplementary merely to the
original suit, out of which it has arisen, and is maintained without reference
9
to the citizenship or residence of the parties.""
On this basis, a federal district
court may entertain an ancillary action even though the ordinary jurisdictional
requisites are not present.
A variation of this concept, involving the application of a familiar principle,
may be expressed thus: When jurisdiction of a given property or subject
matter once attaches, the court having that jurisdiction may consider and dispose
of any suit involving such property or subject-matter, even though this supplemental suit may lack independent jurisdictional requirements.8"
Another major argument which may support a case that cannot stand by
itself is less legal than equitable, but conforms more to the layman's notion
that the courts exist primarily for the purpose of doing justice. This theory,
originating on the equity side of the court, was that the equity powers of a
court enabled it to consider and dispose of any case which it believed essential
to a final disposition of the principal case at hand, independent of the jurisdictional limits of its ordinary power. This theory, necessitating the adoption of
the concept that an ancillary suit is an extraordinary equitable remedy, was
later extended to include actions both at law and in equity."1
Based upon these theories, the ancillary doctrine supplemented the jurisdiction of the federal courts to such an extent that fears were expressed of
undue expansion. Hence there was a shift of emphasis from sustaining the
doctrine as a convenient device to preventing a possible nullification of the
Constitution's restrictive provisions relative to federal judicial power.
This produced the following formula: A federal court having jurisdiction
of a civil action is vested with ancillary jurisdiction over a supplemental proceeding dependent upon the principal suit even though the supplemental proceeding, viewed independently, lacks the attributes of federal jurisdiction, provided
the subject-matter of the supplemental proceeding was: "(1) to aid, enjoin,
or regulate the original suit; (2) to restrain, avoid, explain, or enforce the
(1888). A bill In equity was filed to release lands from a deed of trust and
to remove a cloud upon the title arising out of a sale. The Supreme Court
announced, on looking into the record, "we can find no evidence of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court ... Joel Johnson is the sole defendant, but there
Is no allegation as to his citizenship, nor does that appear anywhere In the
record." The decree below was reversed. The plaintiffs in the equity suit
called the attention of the court to a paragraph of the bill which set forth then
that
by virtue of the sale which they sought to set aside, the defendant
the equity
suit (Johnson) had previously instituted a suit in ejectment on in
the law side
of a federal district court and 'your complainants, not admitted to interpose
their equitable defense to the same he did ... obtain judgment in ejectment
against them." The Supreme Court admitted that it had overlooked this allegation, and that it was sufficient to give the Circuit Court (ancillary) jurisdiction
of the case without any averment of the citizenship of the parties. The suit in
equity was
merely an incident of, and ancillary to, the ejectment suit, and no
other court than the one which rendered judgment in ejectment could now Inter-

fere with it or stay process in it on the ground set forth in the bill.
29. Italics supplied. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. 450,460 (1860).
30. Continental Trust Co. v. Toledo Railway Co., 82 Fed. 642,661
Ohio, 1897), also in 95 Fed. 497 (C.C.A. 6th, 1899) ; krippendorf v. Hyde,(C.C.
110
U.S. 276 (1884); Peck v. Elliot, 79 Fed. 10 (C.C.A. 6th, 1897; Trust Co. v.
Carter 78 Fed. 225 (C.C.A. 5th, 1896) ; Kuhn v. Morrison, 75 Fed. 81 (C.C.
Ga., 1894).

31. Compton v. Jessup, 68 Fed. 263 (C.C.A. 6th, 1895) : "Every court has
inherent equitable power to prevent Its own processes from working injustice
dependent bill in equity, and may afford such relief as right and Justice require."

to anyone, and may entertain a petition by the aggrieved person ... by ancillary or
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judgment or decree therein; or (3) to enforce or obtain an adjudication of
liens upon, or claims to the property in the custody of the court in the original
suit."'" This formula, first advocated in Campell et al. v. Golden Cycle Mining
Co. et al.," was not a retreat from the then existent doctrines of ancillary jurisdiction but had the effect of limiting further expansion. Many cases supported
this limitation for an interim."
However, these restrictions failed to permit the development of ancillary
procedure in situations where it later was most needed."5 Consequently, the
pressure of expansion resulted in a broader framework of which Moore v.
New York Cotton Exchange"' was one of the first cases to embody. This case
established that a federal court having jurisdiction over the principal suit has
ancillary jurisdiction to entertain and determine a counter-claim, even though
the main suit is dismissed on the merits, and the counter-claim, viewed independently, lacks the requisites of federal jurisdiction. The counter-claim is
regarded an ancillary in order that a complete disposal of the controversy
may be had."1
Thus the present status of ancillary jurisdiction's scope may be stated
as, once jurisdiction over the main controversy has attached, a court may grant
all relief necessary to dispose of the action." The doctrine of the Moore case
has been accepted by modern courts as an authoritative recognition that the
field of ancillary jurisdiction is broader than previously understood-distinctly
broader than indicated by such opinions as Campell v. Golden Cycle Mining Co."
32. Brun v. Mann, 151 Fed. 145 150 (C.C.A. 8th, 1906); and cases there
cited. Loy v. Alston, 172 Fed. 90,95 (C.C.A. 8th, 1909).
33. 141 Fed. 610 (C.C.A. 8th, 1905).
34. Further development in the ield resulted in the addition of a fourth
provision (by the same judge who originated the three previous provisions):
"(4) to prevent relitigation in other courts of the issues heard and adjudged
in the original suit, and to protect the titles and rights acquired under its
judgment or decree from attack based on the theory that the adjudication in
the original suit was illegal or lndffective." Pell v. McCabe, 256 Fed. 512.515
(C.C.A. 2d, 1919).
35. As evidenced by the case of Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,
270 U.S. 593 (1926), there may be ancillary suits which are not supplemental
to the original suit, and the trial of which can be had independently of the
original suit. Such a suit would be within the ancillary jurisdiction of a court,
yet not within these three provisions. Cf. 1 Moore Fed. Prac. 469 ; Venner v.
Graves, 255 Fed. 686 (C.C.A. 2d, 1919). But see Lion B. Co. v. Karatz. 262
U.S. 77 (1923). Intervention and some other procedural uses of ancillary jurisdiction essentially require the addition of bringing in of new parties. In conflict
with this iractice are definite statements by some authorities indicating that

no suit can be considered ancillary if it involves the addition of new parties

to the controversy. American Surety Co. v. Lawrencevlle Cement Co., 96 Fed.
25,81 (C.C. Me., 1899). See also Williams, op cit note 8 at 88; Campbell v.
Golden Cycle Min. Co., 141 Fed. 610 (C.C.A. 8th, 1905): Anglo-F. P. Co. v.
MeKibben, 65 Fed. 529 (C.C.A. 5th, 1894). Cf. Barfield v. Zenith T. and R. Cu.,
9 F. (2d) 204 (D.C. Ohio, 1924) ; Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. 450 (1860): "It
would seem from a remark in the opinion [referring to Dunn v. Clarke, 33 U.S. 1
(1834)] that the power of the court was limited to a case between parties to
the original suit. This was probably not intended, as any party may file the
bill whose interests are affected by the suit at law."
36. 270 U.S. 593,610 (1926). See also Kaumagraph Company v. General
Trade Mark Corp., 12 F. Supp. 230 (D.C. N. Y., 1935) ; Hurn v. Oursler, 289
U.S. 238 (1933) ; Chernow v. Cohn and Rosenberg, 5 F. Supp. 869 (D.C. N. Y.,
1934).
37. Cleveland Engineering Co. v. Gallon, 243 Fed. 405 (D.C. Ohio, 1917).
38. See a penetrating note (1940), 53 Harv. L. R. 449,450. Compare Hurn
v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
39. 141 Fed. 610 (C.C.A. 8th, 1905) : Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport
Cor., 29 F. Supp. 112 (D.C. Conn., 1939). Cases cited in 4 Wis. L. R. 43-7
hold that a counter-claim may be retained for affirmative relief after the
principal bill has been dismissed on the merits, even if the counter-cleim has
no independent basis of federal jurisdiction. (Based on former Equity Rule 30.)
Cf. Fidelity Bond and Mortgage Co. v. Grand Lodge, I.O.O.F., 41 F. (2d) 326
(C.C.A. 6th, 1930), holding that a settlement of the principal suit deprives the
court of Jurisdiction over the ancillary claim.
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B. The Third Party Practice and Venue.
Assuming the substantive right of a party to recover against a third party
defendant,"0 two difficulties originally lay in the path of his recovery in a
federal court, where his citizenship was identical with that of the third party
defendant, namely, jurisdictional and procedural requirements. The jurisdictional requirement stems from Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which
states that the federal judicial power shall extend to controversies between
"
citizens of different states. The leading case of Strawbridge v. Curtiss in
interpreting the Judiciary Act implementing this provision, held that where any
plaintiff and any defendant have a common citizenship, federal courts cannot
entertain the action. It would seem therefore, that the Constitutional limitations
preclude the federal courts from assuming jurisdiction."2 However, if the
theory of ancillary jurisdiction is applied, the federal judicial power may then
extend to such a controversy.'" The second obstacle, namely the procedure
for the exercise of this type of ancillary action existed until the promulgation
of Rule 14 of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," which established
an independent federal third party practice.
40. Prior to the new Rules, while a substantive right of recovery existed,
it could only be exercised by separate actions, if the suit was originally brought
in tne federal courts. However, numerous cases involving the third party practice were generally held to be separable controversies requiring an independent
basis for the court's jurisdiction. Sperry v. Keeler Transportation Lines. 28
F. (2d) 897 (D.C. N. Y., 1928).
41. 7 U.S. 267 (1806). See also Raphael v. Trask, 194 U.S. 272 (1904)
Gage v. Riverside Trust Co., lb F'ed. 1002 (C.C. Cal., 1906).
42. For example: P of state 1, sues D oi sLate 2, in the federal district
court of either state on the jurisdictional basis of diversity. D impleads A, a
citizen of state 2, alleging A to be soiey liabie in the suit. The diversity problem
may arise when A attempts to resist tie impleader by alleging lack of diversity
between himself (tire taird party defendant), and D (the tiird party plaintiff).
The problem would also arise if A was a citizen of s~a~e 1, for A couiu argue
that there will be oie judgment renuered, affecting P as plaintiff and A as
third party defendant, tneretore the court should not assume jurisdiction of
the third party controversy because of the lack of diversity. If the court does
assume jurisdiction under these circumstances, it is apparent that the tormula
of Strawblidge v. Curtiss (all plaintiffs must be able to sue all defendan4s)
will not be satisfied. This diversly problem occurs in addition to twe venue
problem, wnicii will be discussed in more detail later. The venue problem arises
when A is from state 3. in such a case, there is no diversity problem, but there
is the problem of whether or not A is entitled to be sued in the district wherein
he is resident.
43. Root v. Woolworth, 150 U.S. 401 (1893) ; Wichita Railroad and Light
Power Co. v. Public Utility Co. of Kansas, 260 U.S. 48 (1922) ; Satink v. Holland,
28 F. Supp. 67 (D.C. N. J., 1939).
44. Rule 14, 28 U.S.C.A., following §723c. The theory of the third party
practice, and its recognition by legal authorities, is not a recent development.
The practice extends back to 1873, in England, and is well developed in the
Admiralty courts of the United States, having first appeared there ten years
later (1883). It has been in use in several states for some time, but procedural
difficulties have until now hampered its development in the federal courts. There
is still no absolute right to implead; it is within the discretion of the court
whether or not to allow it. Apparently, the greatest use of the impleader provision is in the tort field. Rule 14 is set out primarily as a pleading rule. which

further demonstrates that the delay in its federal development was procedural.

On the English practice: Bennett, Alternative Parties and the Common Law
Hangover, (1933) 32 Mich. L. R. 36, 38-42; 1 Moore's Federal Practice §14.04;
Supreme Court of Judicature Act (1873) c. 66, §66, 24(3). For the Admiralty
practice: 1 Moore §14.03; The Hudson, 15 Fed. 162,169 (D.C. N. Y., 1883);
Admiralty Rule 56-promulgated 1883. But see: The Uoyaz, 281 Fed. 259 (D.C.
N. Y., 1922) ; New Jersey Ship, etc., v. Davis, 291 Fed. 617,619 (D.C. N. Y..
1923) ; Jensen v. Bank Line, Ltd., 26 F. (2) 173; (C.C.A. 9th, 1928) ; The
Silverway, 14 F. (2d) 154,157 (D.C. Ga., 1926) ; holding that the practice
involves the use of an original action requiring pleadings as such, and must
be within maritime Jurisdiction. This is in effect a denial that Rule 14 stems
from the practice developed under Admiralty Rule 56. For a discussion of the

state practices; Bennett, 19 Minn. L. R. 163.
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But other problems relating to third party impleader have appeared, the
most pressing of which is the venue question. This is further complicated by
use of the term "jurisdiction over the person," which has been misleadingly
applied to diversity, but more correctly viewed, relates to venue." Venue refers
to the place of trial, and is a personal privilege which can be waived. The
difficulty in the impleader situation arises when the impleaded party objects
to the venue. As previously observed, he cannot raise the diversity issue in
the impleader action because of the ancillary nature of an impleader." And,
as the original suit rests on diversity, he may not object to jurisdiction over
the subject matter. But may he raise the plea of venue? Can a court avoid
this plea by regarding the suit as ancillary, or is the ancillary concept available
only with respect to matters involving jurisdiction? The law on this point is
at present unsettled, and the considerations on both sides make it one difficult
of determination.
In the case of Morrell v. United Air Lines Transport Corp.," the court
held that the third party controversy, being an ancillary cause of action, did
not need to meet the venue requirements of an independent cause of action.
However, in Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp.," a case almost identical
with Morrell v. United Air Lines Transport Corp. as pertains to the impleader,
it was held, that as to parties first brought into the case by the "so-called
ancillary bill," such bill, regardless of the relation of its subject-matter to
the original action, was "necessarily for purposes of jurisdiction over the persons
of the new defendants an 'original action' within the meaning of Section 51
(on venue) of the Judicial Code.""..
Federal courts were previously not required to satisfy independent venue
requirements in ordinary ancillary proceedings." The effect of Rule 14 (providing for the impleader practice) has been to bring third party suits within the
45. The Effect of Extra Jurisdictional Decisions, (1940) 34 Il1. L. R. 567.
Sanborn, Jurisdiction and Venue in the Federal Courts, (1916) 10 Ill. L. R. 99.
46. Crum v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 27 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. W. Va..
1939) ;Tullgren v. Jasper, 27 F. Supp. 413 (D.C. Md., 1939) Kravas v. Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 28 F. Supp. 66 (D.C. Pa., 1939) Satink v. Township of Holland, 28 F. Supp. 67 (D.C. N. J., 1939).
47. 29 F. Supp. 757 (D.C. N. Y., 1939).
48. 29 F. Supp. 112 (D.C. Conn., 1939).
49. Id. at 117. It has been suggested that a third party summons should
be considered ancillary for the purpose of avoiding the limitations as to venue.
In this regard it may be argued that ancillary process, as distinguished from
the "original process" referred to in the venue statute, is available to bring
in as parties to the ancillary suit only those who are already parties to the
original cause, and not new parties. As to these new parties sought to be
brought into the ancillary suit, it partakes of the nature of an original suit,
and the process is governed by the rule as to service and venue applicable to
original process. Since the impleaded party cannot be brought into the suit
without service, he may have the usual objections of an ordinary defendant
as to venue. Pacific R.R. of Mo. v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 111 U.S. 505.522
(1884), also in 3 Fed. 772 (C.C. Mo., 1880) ; Manning v. Berdan, 132 Fed. 382
(C.C. N. J., 1904). To the effect that third party process may not be served
outside of the state in which the action is pending (Rule 82), see F. and M.
Skirt Co. v. Wimpfheimer and Bro., 27 F. Supp. 239 (D.C. Mass., 1939).
The third party defendant in an impleader situation is certainly in a very
different situation than a defendant to a counter-claim, or in the intervention
or substitution situations. In these latter cases he has entered the suit voluntarily, and may be said to have waived the venue privilege. Leman v. KrentlerArnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448 (1932) ; General Electric v. Marvel Rare
Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430 (1932).
50. Dunlap v. Stetson, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,164, at 179 (C.C. Me., 1927).
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ancillary control of the federal courts." Therefore it has been suggested5" that
the litigation of the original suit being properly begun in a federal court, a
complete disposition of the entire controversy necessitates that the third party
be impleaded irrespective of the venue requirements of an independent action.
The purpose of Rule 14 is to dispose of, in a single action, all related controversies arising out of one transaction or occurrence. However, this argument
fails to effectuate Rule 82," which says: "These rules shall not be construed
to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States
or the venue of the actions therein." As can be seen, this gives rise to two
conflicting schools of thought, namely, those who may oppose and those who
may favor extension of the ancillary doctrine to include venue.
Opposition to extension may be based on the grounds that it infringes
the customary privileges of a defendant, and that it conflicts with the principle
of strict statutory construction. The ancillary device has resulted in expansion
of federal jurisdiction beyond that expressly provided for in the Constitution
and further limited by supporting statutes; therefore, the term "ancillary"
may be regarded as producing a forbidden result. It may be argued that Rule 14
was not intended to deprive an impleaded party of his usual procedural objections, and that as applied to venue, the third party action should be considered
original. Under this view, use of the ancillary doctrine would be limited to
giving a court jurisdiction (judicial power) over a controversy, but it would
not be used to alleviate procedural deficiencies preventing the effective exercise
of this jurisdiction.
A converse position would favor the absolute extension of ancillary powers
to cover this phase. The analogy of the practice prior to the new Rules, if
applied to the impleader situation under the Rules, would eliminate the venue
difficulty. Further, since jurisdiction (judicial power) over the parties and
the controversy already exists, by virtue of the ancillary nature of the proceeding, this procedural defect should not hamper a final and complete disposition of the entire controversy. This is substantiated by the absence, in Official
Form 22,' of any allegation of jurisdiction or venue, nor is it required by
Rule 14. And finally, if ancillary jurisdiction is to be used at all to give a
court jurisdiction of a proceeding, it should include all aspects of procedure,
which should be the secondary considerations.
However, these two opposed positions may not be the only solution of
the venue question. Further light may be shed by other pertinent considerations.
The venue privilege is created by statute, 5 the impleader practice by a procedural rule of court.5" In addition to the convenience to court procedure, the
51.
52.
53.
54.

Tullgren v. Jasper, 27 F. Supp. 413 (D.C. Md., 1939).
26 Va. L. R. 376.
Rule 82, 28 U.S.C.A., following §273c.
This'is used for motions to bring in third party defendants. See 4

55.

§51 Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. §112. Venue is generally regarded as

Ohllnger's Fed. Prac. 405 (1939).

a matter of procedure, although the privilege of immunity from suit except In
the particular district specified by statute has been held to be a matter of substantive law in Durabilt Steel Locker Co. v. Berger Mfg. Co., 21 F. (2d) 139.141
(D.C. Ohio, 1927).

56. The general purpose of the Rule providing for the impleader practice
is to combine two actions which should be tried together to save the time
and cost of reduplication of evidence, and to obtain consistent results from
similar evidence. In an address broadcast on the National Radio Forum hour
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purpose of the impleader practice is to promote the convenience of an original
plaintiff or a third party plaintiff, while the purpose of the venue statute is
to promote the convenience of a defendant and to avoid a burden which might
exist if he were compelled to answer in any district or wherever found. Therefore, with some danger of over-simplification, the issue may be narrowed down
to a balance of conveniences.
A result more equitable than either of the views above expressed may be
obtained by adopting the theory of a balance of conveniences. Under this theory,
the hindering effect of venue on federal procedure would be eliminated by
placing it in the discretion of the trial judge. As with other discretionary
matters, the decision of the trial judge should be reversed only for abuse of
discretion. Such reversals are, in practice, comparatively rare. The entire third
party proceeding should correctly be viewed as ancillary, but the court should,
in its discretion, throw the balance with regard to venue in favor of the party
most inconvenienced. In this way, there need be no iron rule,. and the venue
objection would be neither denied nor allowed in all cases, but would be permitted only where extension of the ancillary doctrine would be too inconvenient
to the third party defendant. Only when it is recognized that the primary
consideration is, after all, convenience, can the elasticity of the ancillary structure be molded to include the proper phases of jurisdiction.
The application of this system of deciding venue requires the construction
that neither Rule 82 nor the venue statute prohibit the extension of the ancillary
on November 21, 1938, Solicitor General (now Attorney General) Robert H.
Jackson discussed the new rules of civil procedure for the federal courts
promulgated by the Supreme Court by authority of act of Congress. A study
of the work of the appellate courts had shown that for several years 49.8%
of all their cases were disputes over procedure. The new rules, it was hoped,
would enable lawyers to cease devoting half their time "not to what the decislon
should be, but how a decision should be reached." Their purpose Is to "give
litigants a prompt, fair, and inexpensive trial on the merits, regardless of technicalities." It is interesting to note the legislative Intent with regard to the
general scope of the rule as applid to jurisdictional considerations. Appearing
nefore the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on
March 3, 1938, Maj. Edgar B. Tolman said: "Under Rule 14, a man is sued
alone on a Joint and several obligation, he may file a petition to bring In the
others who are liable and make them parties to the action ... Take a man
who is liable on a contract and who has taken a bond from another man to
perform the work in due time and Indemnify him from liability. Now, under
the present law he could not make that man a party to his suit. This Rule permits you to bring In the man who is liable to you and In the one hearing you
dispose of the question of his liability to Indemnify you without the delay and
expense of another action. Now, the Rule goes one step further. It is new in ordinary lawsuits but it is a hundred years old in the admiralty courts. Following that
analogy, a man who is sued may deny his liability and in addition may show that
another person is responsible and bring that person in, and the court or jury may
hear the case against both of them, and place the responsibility where it lawfully belongs." Hearings, P. 103. Maj. Tolman was asked by Representative
Walter Chandler: "Suppose a party whom the defendant attempts to bring Into
court ha'-pens to be a resident of the same state in which the plaintiff resides,
what about the question of diversity?" To which Maj. Tolman answered: "He
cannot be brought in." In answer to Representative John Robinson's question,
"He cannot be brought in unless he could have been originally sued?" Maj.
Tolm-n said: "That is it." Hearing, p. 105. For the actual practice in this
regard, see note 47, supra.
Addressing the Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit regarding the
second draft of the proposed Rules, Edward H. Hammond said: "The rule on
bringing in, as parties, persons who were not original parties to the suit, has
been broadened so as to permit the bringing in, by a party against whom a
claim is asserted, of parties who are or may be liable to the party asserting
the claim for all or part thereof. Under the old rule only persons who are or
may be liable to the party bringing them in for all or part of the claim asserted
were permitted to be thus brought in. Admiralty lawyers, citing with approval
the admiralty practice, strongly urged this extension of the rule. The bringing
in of third parties is still a matter of discretion with the court and not of right.
Under the Admiralty rule it is a matter of right." 23 A.B.A. Jour. 629,631.
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network to include the venue phase. The considerations of statutory interpretation and legislative intent with which the courts have heretofore been concerned
are then eliminated, and the primary consideration is whether the court should
deny or permit the objection to venue in a given case. Behind this decision
are the interests of convenience and substantial justice; i.e., the usual characteristics of ancillary jurisdiction. Since the application of the impleader practice
is within the court's discretion, the decision as to venue should also rest on
this basis, rather than on the refinements of legal theory.
It is realized that practical considerations under the present system have
led lawyers to require that venue be fixed and certain, readily ascertainable
before trial to avoid reversal on the ground of improper venue. However, the
amount of litigation decided on this point indicates that this method has not
obtained the desired result. It is believed that discretionary venue as here suggested, would result in a desirable flexibility in federal procedure.
Jerome Silberg.

